Opinion | The Failing Doctrine: How Pakistan’s Use of Jihad as State Policy Is Backfiring

Operation Sindoor is being cited in global media as a model of “surgical deterrence”—a clean, time-bound, and effective response to cross-border terrorism.

For decades, Pakistan has employed jihad as a strategic tool in its foreign policy, particularly targeting India and Afghanistan. This approach, deeply embedded within its military and intelligence establishments, aimed to leverage militant groups as proxies to achieve geopolitical objectives without direct confrontation. However, this doctrine is increasingly proving counterproductive, leading to regional instability, international isolation, and internal turmoil.

The roots of this policy trace back to the 1980s during the Soviet-Afghan war, where Pakistan, with support from the United States and other allies, facilitated the training and arming of mujahideen fighters. Post the Soviet withdrawal, these fighters were redirected towards Kashmir, intensifying the insurgency in the region. Groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) emerged, receiving tacit support from Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency.

However, the global landscape has evolved. The international community, particularly post the 9/11 attacks, has become less tolerant of state-sponsored terrorism. Pakistan’s continued harboring of terrorist groups has led to its placement on the Financial Action Task Force’s (FATF) grey list, impacting its economy and international standing.

Domestically, the repercussions are severe. The very groups once considered strategic assets have turned inwards, challenging the state’s authority. The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has launched numerous attacks within Pakistan, targeting civilians and security forces alike. The sectarian violence, fueled by extremist ideologies, has further fragmented Pakistani society.

The recent Pahalgam terror attack in Jammu and Kashmir, where 25 Indian citizens and one Nepali tourist were killed, underscores the persistent threat posed by Pakistan-backed groups. The Resistance Front, believed to be a proxy of LeT, claimed responsibility. This act of violence not only strained India-Pakistan relations but also drew widespread condemnation from the international community.

In response, India launched “Operation Sindoor,” a precision military operation targeting terror camps in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK). Conducted on the night of May 6-7, 2025, the operation dismantled nine terrorist camps within 25 minutes, eliminating approximately 140 terrorists, including high-value targets like Yusuf Azhar and Abu Jundal . Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh emphasized that the operation’s impact reached as far as Rawalpindi, the headquarters of the Pakistani military .

Prime Minister Narendra Modi, addressing the nation post-operation, stated, “On May 7, the whole world saw our resolve turn into action,” highlighting India’s commitment to counterterrorism . The operation received bipartisan support within India, with leaders across the political spectrum lauding the armed forces’ precision and effectiveness.

Internationally, Pakistan’s duplicity has been exposed. At the United Nations, India labeled Pakistan a “rogue state fueling global terrorism,” citing its continued support for terrorist organizations . The global community’s patience is wearing thin, with increasing calls for Pakistan to dismantle its terror infrastructure.

The doctrine of using jihad as state policy is proving unsustainable. The blowback, both domestically and internationally, is intensifying. Pakistan faces a choice: continue down this path of self-destruction or pivot towards genuine peace and cooperation. The world watches, hoping for the latter.

What makes the current situation more volatile is the growing internal dissent within Pakistan. The country is facing a severe economic crisis, with inflation, unemployment, and political instability gripping every corner. Instead of focusing on development and reform, the state’s institutions have remained preoccupied with managing and justifying their decades-old obsession with asymmetric warfare. Ironically, this very strategy has now become a millstone around Pakistan’s neck. International investors are wary, tourism is nearly non-existent, and even traditional allies like Saudi Arabia and China are urging Islamabad to rein in its radical networks and focus on internal stability.Additionally, Pakistan’s youth—many of whom are educated and digitally connected—are beginning to question the state’s narrative. There is an emerging realization that exporting jihad has brought neither strategic victory nor domestic peace. On platforms like X (formerly Twitter), students, journalists, and civil society activists are openly criticizing Pakistan’s priorities and asking hard questions about the role of the military in foreign policy. This internal discourse, although still limited and often suppressed, signals a potential shift in public sentiment.

Meanwhile, the Indian strategy of coupling military response with diplomatic isolation of Pakistan seems to be gaining traction. From Washington to Paris, and from Tokyo to Canberra, there is growing consensus that Pakistan must act decisively against terrorism or face growing international marginalization. Operation Sindoor is being cited in global media as a model of “surgical deterrence”—a clean, time-bound, and effective response to cross-border terrorism. It demonstrated India’s new doctrine: restraint is not weakness, and provocation will be met with precision.India’s calibrated use of force has also helped it win diplomatic favor while avoiding escalation. The fact that Operation Sindoor was carried out without civilian casualties or collateral damage won it rare praise even from traditionally non-aligned observers. Analysts point out that such actions are a signal not just to terrorists but also to their patrons.

In contrast, Pakistan’s denial mode has only worsened its credibility. Statements from the Pakistani military, attempting to brush off the losses or project India’s actions as “fabrications,” have not convinced anyone. With satellite imagery, intercepted communications, and even internal leaks surfacing, Islamabad’s narrative appears increasingly hollow.

The situation in Balochistan further amplifies Pakistan’s policy failure. Here too, the state’s violent crackdown on political dissent, enforced disappearances, and the use of extremist proxies have backfired. Instead of quelling unrest, these tactics have globalized the Baloch cause, drawing attention from human rights organizations and governments alike. What began as a demand for autonomy is gradually gaining recognition as a broader movement against systemic repression.

What remains clear is that the use of terrorism as a tool of statecraft has outlived its utility for Pakistan. While the strategic establishment in Rawalpindi might have once considered jihad a low-cost, high-return investment, the returns are now proving catastrophic. Not only is Pakistan suffering economic and diplomatic losses, but it is also hemorrhaging internally—with sectarian divides, insurgencies, and public disillusionment on the rise.

India, on the other hand, continues to strengthen its global partnerships, boost its economy, and invest in its security apparatus. With a clear-eyed counterterrorism doctrine and growing international goodwill, it is changing the rules of engagement in South Asia.

History has repeatedly shown that states that choose violence as policy often fall victim to the very monsters they create. Pakistan stands at such a crossroad today. Whether it course-corrects or continues down the path of self-destruction will determine not just its own future but the peace and stability of the entire region.

About the Author

Tahir Jahanzeeb is a Kashmir-based columnist and security affairs analyst. He writes on regional geopolitics, terrorism, and India’s counterstrategy with a focus on Pakistan’s proxy warfare.He can be reached on syedjahanzeeb2@gmail.com