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The Baloch national struggle, often misunderstood or reduced to the discourse of terrorism and separatism, is in fact a profound movement rooted in a complex history of autonomy, cultural identity, and resistance to marginalization. Since 1948, Balochistan has seen five major insurgencies against the Pakistani state, each iteration building upon historical grievances and evolving in sophistication and purpose. The Baloch question is not simply a regional problem; it is a deeply political issue that challenges the foundation of state-making in Pakistan, asking critical questions about consent, federalism, and human rights.
The roots of this struggle lie in the controversial accession of the princely state of Kalat to Pakistan in March 1948. The Khanate of Kalat had declared independence in August 1947, the same month Pakistan was formed. While other princely states like Hyderabad and Junagadh faced political pressure to join India or Pakistan, Kalat’s claim was unique in that it had treaties with the British Crown and considered itself sovereign. Nevertheless, under immense pressure, the Khan of Kalat signed the Instrument of Accession, a decision that immediately sparked unrest among the Baloch population. Prince Abdul Karim, the Khan’s brother, launched the first armed rebellion against Pakistan, setting the tone for decades of resistance.
What followed was a series of insurgencies that reflected the Baloch people’s discontent with how the Pakistani state treated their land and lives. In 1958, the One Unit policy, which merged all western provinces of Pakistan into a single administrative entity to counterbalance East Pakistan, intensified feelings of marginalization. Nawab Nauroz Khan led the second major revolt in response to this policy, which was seen as a direct attack on Baloch identity and political representation. After months of guerrilla warfare, Nauroz Khan and his followers were captured, and several of them, including his sons, were hanged. The betrayal of a ceasefire promise by the Pakistani government during this time left a deep scar in Baloch memory.
The 1960s and 1970s witnessed a significant escalation in the Baloch national movement. With the discovery of natural gas and mineral wealth in Balochistan, the Pakistani state’s economic interest in the province grew rapidly. However, local Baloch communities received little benefit from these resources. The Sui gas fields, for instance, have powered homes and industries in Punjab and Sindh for decades, while large parts of Balochistan still remain without basic energy infrastructure. This economic exploitation became a central grievance in the third and fourth insurgencies, especially during the tenure of Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.
In 1973, Bhutto dismissed the elected Balochistan government, accusing it of conspiring with foreign elements. This led to the largest and most organized insurgency to date, with support allegedly coming from Iraq and the Soviet Union. Pakistan responded with overwhelming military force, with Iran also providing helicopters and logistical support to quash the rebellion. An estimated 5,000 Baloch fighters and civilians were killed during the conflict. It was during this period that the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) emerged as a prominent armed group. Though crushed militarily by 1977, the movement laid the groundwork for future waves of resistance.
The current and most prolonged phase of the insurgency began in the early 2000s. Unlike previous movements led primarily by tribal chiefs, this phase has been driven by a younger, more educated cohort. It was catalyzed by the assassination of Nawab Akbar Bugti in 2006, a former governor and chief minister who had turned against the state due to its exploitative policies. Bugti’s death at the hands of the military triggered widespread protests and inspired a new generation of Baloch youth to take up arms or organize politically. This period has also seen the rise of new armed factions like the Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF) and United Baloch Army (UBA), each with its own ideological and tactical distinctions.
What distinguishes the current struggle is the parallel rise of nonviolent resistance. Groups like the Baloch Yakjehti Committee (BYC), led by activists such as Dr. Mahrang Baloch, have mobilized civil society against enforced disappearances and military excesses. Thousands of Baloch men have been abducted by security forces, with many turning up dead or never being found. These disappearances have been documented by human rights organizations like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. Families of the disappeared have marched across the country, from Quetta to Islamabad, carrying pictures of their loved ones. In a recent interview with The Diplomat, Dr. Baloch emphasized, “We do not demand anything beyond our constitutional rights, but when even peaceful protest is met with bullets, what choice do we have?”
International media and academic institutions have begun to take greater interest in the Balochistan issue. A 2025 report by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point noted the increasing operational sophistication of Baloch insurgents, citing the March 2025 hijacking of the Jaffar Express by BLA-Jeyand Faction militants. Over 400 passengers were held hostage, and more than two dozen were killed, demonstrating not just the insurgents’ capabilities but also their desperation. While such tactics are controversial and often condemned internationally, they reflect the extreme measures some factions are willing to take in pursuit of autonomy.
The ideological underpinnings of the movement have also matured. Veteran activist and writer Mir Muhammad Ali Talpur argues that the Baloch cause is not merely separatist but decolonial. In his writings, he asserts, “The Pakistani state treats Balochistan as a colony, extracting its resources while suppressing its people. This is not a rebellion; this is a liberation struggle.” Such framing has resonated with diaspora communities in Europe and North America, who have organized protests and lobbied international institutions to take up the Baloch cause.
Yet the state’s response remains heavily militarized. According to a 2024 Le Monde report, military operations in districts like Kech, Gwadar, and Mastung have displaced thousands, often with little media coverage. Checkpoints, surveillance, and the presence of paramilitary forces have normalized a state of exception in Balochistan, where civil liberties are regularly suspended. In February 2025, Dr. Mahrang Baloch was arrested during a peaceful sit-in. The act drew condemnation from international human rights organizations, and her eventual release was seen as a rare moment of victory for civil protest.
Children and youth continue to bear the brunt of this protracted conflict. The Guardian recently profiled Sammi Deen Baloch, a young activist whose father disappeared in 2009. Her words were both heartbreaking and illuminating: “I only protest. I want to go to school.” Her statement underscores how deeply the conflict affects not just political outcomes but everyday lives, aspirations, and futures.
The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a cornerstone of Pakistan’s economic ambitions, has further complicated the situation. While the government touts CPEC as a game-changer, many Baloch see it as another form of exploitation. Gwadar, a key port in CPEC, remains underdeveloped and heavily militarized. Locals have protested against fishing restrictions, land grabs, and lack of employment opportunities. In December 2024, coordinated attacks by insurgents targeted multiple CPEC-linked installations, signaling that any economic development in the region that excludes local participation will be resisted.
The Baloch national struggle is a multifaceted movement with historical depth and contemporary urgency. It is a struggle for recognition, for justice, and for the right to self-determination. Whether through armed resistance, political activism, or civil protest, the Baloch people continue to assert their agency in the face of systemic oppression. As long as the state responds with militarization rather than dialogue, and as long as the root causes of economic and political exclusion remain unaddressed, peace in Balochistan will remain elusive. The international community, too, must move beyond token condemnations and engage substantively with the voices of Balochistan. For, as Talpur aptly states, “This is not about breaking away; it is about breaking free.”
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