Opinion | Pak uses proxies as it can’t match India’s military might

Unless and until there is a drastic shift in Pakistan’s military strategy from proxy war to open negotiation, the specter of proxy war is going to haunt South Asia.

Between nuclear-armed neighbors India and Pakistan, both were the outcomes of the violent partition of 1947. Although each country has engaged in conventional wars in the past 1947, 1965, 1971, and 1999 since the late 1980s, there has been a change of policy on the part of Pakistan. Unable to match India’s expanding military strength, Pakistan resorted to unconventional conflict, utilizing stateless agents and militant proxies for pursuing strategic aims, specifically within Indian Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir. In the 1980s, under the banner of combating Soviet troops in Afghanistan, Pakistan, aided by the United States, nurtured and armed Afghan Mujahideen. The campaign served not only short-term geopolitical purposes but also established the infrastructure to carry out proxy wars in the future. Islamabad’s concept of gaining strategic depth in Afghanistan had come during that period with a view to ensuring a friendly Western border freeing up Pakistan to focus on India. After the departure of the Soviet Union, these same proxy mechanisms and ideologies had been diverted in the direction of Kashmir. Early in the 1990s, Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) had a key role in nurturing groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) apparently to aid the liberation of Kashmir.

Pakistan’s dependence on proxies is a reflection of its larger strategic rationale of Unconventional warfare. As India enjoys an evident conventional military superiority in both personnel and weaponry, Pakistan used terrorist and insurgent organizations as instruments to make India pay at reduced risk. This strategy sought to bleed India gradually, occupying its military in extended counter insurgency efforts in Kashmir. One of the central elements of this policy is Strategic Distance. By acting through organizations such as LeT, JeM, Hizbul Mujahideen, The Resistance Front (TRF), Pakistan keeps itself at arms’ length from direct open accountability. TRF was founded in 2019 and is generally considered to be a rebranded LeT’s proxy established to evade international attention while conducting attacks. Pakistan officially holds the line that it gives only “moral and diplomatic” support to these organizations, while intelligence inputs from India and Western agencies regularly link these groups to ISI sponsorship. The 2008 Mumbai attacks, in which 10 LeT militants killed more than 160 civilians, serve as a stark reminder of the destruction these proxies can cause. Like the 2019 Pulwama suicide bombing by JeM, this killed 40 Indian paramilitary personnel. India, in turn, has answered with a combination of military, diplomatic, and technological responses. Surgical strikes in 2016 and the Balakot air strike in 2019 showed India’s determination to retaliate across the LoC. Concurrently, New Delhi has ramped up its diplomatic efforts to designate Pakistan as a state sponsor of terrorism, leading to Pakistan being grey-listed by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) for a number of years. Locally, India has augmented the deployment of troops, strengthened border patrolling, and raised counter-insurgency operations in Kashmir. India has recognized this and is simultaneously investing in grassroots governance, development, and youth engagement in Jammu and Kashmir to counter radicalization and build long-term peace.

Most recently, the April 2025 Pahalgam attack again brought Pakistan’s policy of proxy warfare into the limelight. Terrorists armed with guns attacked tourists in the Baisaran Valley and killed 26 civilians. The Resistance Front claimed the attack. This incident was not merely viewed as an act of terror but as a part of overall strategy to destabilize Kashmir, discourage tourism, and provoke communal tensions. The attack has intensified tensions between Pakistan and India. The extent of civilian deaths and alleged cross-border sponsorship of terrorism by them has prompted bitter condemnation from Indian leadership as well as renewed demands for drastic action.

India has held the attack on Resistance Front (TRF), the proxy of Pakistan-based banned organization Lashkar-e-Taiba. In retaliation, India has taken several steps: suspending the Indus Water Treaty, shutting the Wagah-Attari Border, and inviting the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to re-examine Pakistan’s lending programs on the grounds of security issues. All these actions point towards India trying to isolate economically and diplomatically. In response, Pakistan has refused to have anything to do with the attack and has taken retaliatory measures: suspending the Simla Agreement, shutting down its airspace to Indian planes, and suspending all trade with India. Diplomatic personnel at the Indian High Commission in Islamabad were drastically cut back, and visas granted to Indian citizens were suspended, leaving the Kartarpur Corridor open only to Sikh pilgrims.

The use of proxy groups by Pakistan goes beyond Kashmir. In Afghanistan, Pakistan has traditionally backed the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani Network to keep a leash on Kabul and limit Indian presence in the area. The Taliban’s resurgence after 2021, even as it remained in line with Pakistan’s strategic interests in Afghanistan, has also introduced new complicities, especially when such proxies encourage forces such as Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) that now directly target Pakistani military personnel.

Pakistan’s dependence on proxy war is a result of its strategic thinking that an open conflict with India is unwinnable. However, the policy has proved to be more detrimental than beneficial, not only to India but also to Pakistan. It has promoted an atmosphere of extremism that poses a threat to regional peace and debilitates Pakistan’s international image. Unless and until there is a drastic shift in Pakistan’s military strategy from proxy war to open negotiation, the specter of proxy war is going to haunt South Asia. The recent incident in Pahalgam is not isolated but is a part of a big, planned policy that should be met with firmness, clarity, and international unity. The irony of Pakistan holding a seat on the UNSC while supporting proxy terrorists cannot be overlooked. The world cannot close its eyes to terrorism as a state policy. It is only by persistent pressure, international cooperation, and unrelenting vigilance that the cycle of proxy violence can be ended and a path towards enduring peace be created.

Author can be reached Pirzadarehan52@gmail.com