Opinion | Pakistan and Bangladesh: Bonhomie or Compulsion?

A History of Wounds, Diplomatic Gestures, and Unresolved Tensions
The Pakistan-Bangladesh relationship is more like a historical wound that never actually heals. More than half a century after Bangladesh gained independence, the wounds of 1971 continue to linger, shaping the way the two countries interact with one another. There are flashes of warmth—leaders smiling at one another, extending an offer for diplomatic outreach—but beneath it all, there is an embarrassment, a reluctance that won’t go away. For India, which played a key role in Bangladesh’s liberation, this is not so much a question of two countries trying to heal; it’s a reminder of how history continues to shape the politics of South Asia.
For Bangladesh, the war memories are personal. The brutal repression by the Pakistani army, the massacres, the millions who poured into India as refugees—these are not abstractions between the lines of textbooks but lived experiences for a generation. Dhaka has long insisted on a formal apology from Islamabad, something Pakistan has so far successfully avoided. There have been half-hearted apologies but never of the kind Bangladesh demands. For Bangladeshis, this refusal is not just diplomatic; it is an insult to the war’s sacrifices. India, having seen the struggle at close range and having provided useful assistance, can express its feelings in full. The emotional bonds between India and Bangladesh are strong, and the Pakistan-Bangladesh equation becomes that much more important for New Delhi.
But while history has remained bitter, Bangladesh has never quite shut its door on Pakistan. Successive regimes in Dhaka have pursued mixed policies over time. Under Ziaur Rahman and subsequently Khaleda Zia, things were warmer between Dhaka and Islamabad. There was greater interaction, and there was even a bid to turn the page. But under Sheikh Hasina, Bangladesh has been uncompromising, and it has made it clear that there can be no relationship with Pakistan without the question of accountability for 1971. Hasina’s government has taken it further and held war crimes tribunals and given death sentences to collaborators of the Pakistani army, something Islamabad has always denounced.
Aside from these tensions, there is commerce between the two countries, though a far cry from Bangladesh’s economic engagement with India or China. Business will prevail always, even if politics won’t. Pakistan sells cement, textiles, and medicine to Bangladesh, and Bangladesh sells jute and clothing. There have been proposals to expand this commerce, but the political barriers too frequently dominate economic potential. For India, which enjoys a much stronger trade relationship with Bangladesh, these occasional economic transactions between Dhaka and Islamabad are nothing to fear. The figures tell the real story—Bangladesh’s economy is inextricably intertwined with India’s, and any significant economic movement towards Pakistan is highly unlikely.
Geopolitics further complicates this already. With China taking the center stage in South Asia, Pakistan and Bangladesh have both interacted with Beijing in different capacities. Bangladesh, in its close friendship with India, has been receptive to Chinese investment, balancing its foreign policy with prudence. Pakistan is, however, dependent on China, with China serving as a counter to India. This shared economic engagement with China has, at times, put Pakistan and Bangladesh on the same table, but their strategic interests are inherently disparate. For India, this is a space to watch but not a space of concern, as Bangladesh’s core interests are still with New Delhi.
Security is also one area where Pakistan and Bangladesh have traditionally been on different pages. Bangladesh, having experienced extremism in the past, has taken firm steps to keep radical forces in line, ensuring stability in the country. Dhaka, led by Hasina, has cracked down on extremist networks and enhanced counterterrorism efforts—efforts that India has actively encouraged. Pakistan, on the other hand, has grappled with its own internal security challenges and the albatross of being accused of hiding extremist networks. This natural divergence of approach ensures that any serious security cooperation between Pakistan and Bangladesh is not a possibility. For India, Bangladesh’s firm line on radicalism has been an assurance factor for regional security.
There have been low-key but significant diplomatic moves of late between Dhaka and Islamabad. Islamabad has extended invitation gestures, gestures of goodwill, and even of an eagerness to turn over a new leaf. These have been largely symbolic, however. Pakistan means little to Bangladesh; its economic interests and political destiny are tied to stronger partners—India, America, and a rising China. While Dhaka may have a functioning relationship with Islamabad, it has no reason of necessity to put heavy investments in re-engagement, particularly in the absence of an official apology for 1971.
For India, the shifting Pakistan-Bangladesh dynamics is something to observe and not be concerned about. The reality is simple: Bangladesh and India share a common history, culture, and future. Connectivity projects, trade, water-sharing agreements, and border control are all areas where India and Bangladesh are in close coordination. No amount of diplomatic courtesy between Pakistan and Bangladesh can change that simple math. Pakistan’s moves towards Bangladesh are an expression of necessity, not overtures to rapprochement. Isolated in the region, with economic and political issues piling up, Pakistan seeks Bangladesh as a chance to come out of diplomatic isolation. To Bangladesh, however, to talk to Pakistan is primarily a diplomatic concession and not for the establishment of any such dedicated alliance. There remains tension in the relations, more as a political balancing act and not as any sense of brotherhood. Ultimately, history will not be washed away, nor can overnight efforts establish trust. Bangladesh’s relations with Pakistan will forever bear the burden of 1971, and short of Islamabad’s meaningful steps towards facing that history, relations will at best be courtly but lacking in depth. For India, this merely underlines that the best partnerships that it has within the subcontinent are forged out of shared heritage, respect for each other’s histories, and a vision that they are capable of seeing past the current crisis.
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