Opinion | Pakistan Dilemma: Abraham Accords

Pakistan is stuck between its old policy on Israel and a new regional reality where many Muslim countries are normalizing ties with Israel.

The Abraham Accords are a series of United States-brokered diplomatic agreements launched in 2020 designed to normalize relations between Israel and several Arab nations. By prioritizing economic, security, and technological partnerships, the accords marked a historic shift in Middle Eastern geopolitics.

Following the recent U.S.-Israel–Iran conflict, a temporary ceasefire was brokered with reportedly significant diplomatic involvement from Pakistan. Since then, the Abraham Accords have once again attracted attention, with several unverified reports suggesting that other major Arab nations may be considering joining the framework. The region’s political landscape has undergone significant changes in recent years, prompting renewed discussions about normalization, strategic partnerships, and the future direction of Middle Eastern diplomacy. However, many of these reports remain speculative and should be viewed with caution until officially confirmed.

In the Middle East’s neighbouring region of South Asia lies Pakistan, an economically strained nation that remains heavily dependent on the cash-rich states of the Middle East for its survival, economic support, and periodic financial bailouts. As a result, Islamabad often calibrates its diplomatic posture in line with the region’s evolving political alignments and strategic dynamics to safeguard its economic interests and maintain strong ties with key Middle Eastern partners and that is where Pakistan finds itself in a political labyrinth. With renewed discussions surrounding the Abraham accords, many geopolitical analysts have turned their attention toward Islamabad. Changes in Middle Eastern politics often exert significant influence on Pakistan’s foreign policy calculations, raising questions about how it views the Abraham accords and the prospect of recognizing Israel or normalizing relations with it. Should more key Middle Eastern players express interest in joining the framework, Pakistan may face increasing pressure to reassess its approach while balancing regional realities, domestic sensitivities, and its long-standing policy positions.

Historically and ideologically, Pakistan has refused to recognize the State of Israel. Its passport famously includes the statement that it is “valid for all countries of the world except Israel.” Over the years, Pakistan has maintained that it will not recognize Israel until the establishment of an independent Palestinian state based on pre-1967 borders. This position has gradually become a key element of Pakistan’s foreign policy framework. It is rooted in support for the Palestinian cause and has earned Pakistan appreciation among Palestinian sympathizers and segments of the broader Muslim world that share a similar stance on the issue.

Pakistan’s foreign policy is rarely straightforward; there is usually a catch. Over time, Pakistan has ingrained anti-Israel sentiment among its citizens and has gained significant political leverage from this stance. Even if Pakistan were to consider joining the Abraham Accords, domestic sentiment and emotional narratives would act as major constraints. On one side, changing Middle Eastern realities and political calculations could push Pakistan toward signing or at least considering the Abraham Accords; on the other hand, its local anti-Israel emotional narrative, historical position, and foreign policy framework act as strong barriers. Thus, Pakistan finds itself in a deeply complex situation where its political interests demand one path while its ideological commitments demand another.

Joining the Abraham Accords is like a two-edged sword for Pakistan; it has pros internationally and cons domestically. What would Pakistan gain by joining the Abraham Accords? Firstly, appreciations from superpowers like the U.S.A. and its allies. Israel has advanced technology and weapons systems; by participating in the Abraham Accords, Pakistan may gain access to such advanced technology and systems. If ties are normalized, Pakistan may boost its economy through trade and remittances. If key Middle Eastern nations join the Accords along with Pakistan, it could continue to exert significant influence in the region. Israel and Pakistan have not fought a war but are considered hostile to each other; if Pakistan joins the Accords, it may reduce a perceived Israeli threat it believes exists. If Pakistan considers the Abraham Accords and more Arab nations join, it would continue to maintain healthy relations with its key Arab partners, while oil trade and remittances would continue to flow into Pakistan.

The other major question is: what will Pakistan lose if it joins the Accords? The foremost issue is the loss of political leverage within the country and the risk of a strong backlash from its citizens. For Pakistan, joining the Accords would be seen as an ideological defeat and a deviation from its core principles, as well as a betrayal of the aspirations and emotions of millions of Palestinian supporters. It could be perceived as compromising its long-standing position on Palestine. For years, Pakistan has maintained a pro-Ummah image globally; aligning with the Abraham Accords could risk diluting or distorting that image. Pakistani public opinion is overwhelmingly pro-Palestine, and any visible shift toward the Accords could trigger domestic unrest and strong political opposition factors it can ill afford to ignore. Beyond domestic politics, such a move could also strain trust with segments of its traditional foreign policy partners who view the Palestinian issue as central. It may also force Pakistan into a difficult balancing act between new strategic opportunities and long-held ideological commitments, creating long-term diplomatic ambiguity.

The labyrinth does not stop here. What would Pakistan lose or gain by not joining the Accords? If it stays away from the changing political atmosphere in the Middle East, where more Arab nations show interest in joining the Accords, it could face political marginalisation in the region. Pakistan may lose billions in aid, remittances, and overseas job opportunities if the Abraham Accords framework becomes a wider Arab reality something it can ill afford. The Middle East is Pakistan’s jugular vein in terms of economic and energy stability. Pakistan can never afford a scenario where Israel becomes an established player in Arab political forums, as it may lose its control and influence if Israel shares a seat at the Arab political table.

What Pakistan gains by not joining the Abraham Accords is mainly a moral victory and a staunch anti-Israel stance. It preserves political leverage domestically and helps avoid potential backlash or face-saving issues within the country. It also helps prevent domestic unrest, maintains its long-standing position on Palestine, and continues to earn appreciation from pro-Palestinian supporters and sympathisers. Beyond this, however, the tangible strategic or economic gains remain limited.

Ultimately, the “Pakistan dilemma” in the post-Abraham Accords era is not about a binary choice between acceptance or rejection of a new regional order. It is about managing the tension between continuity and adaptation. Preserving ideological consistency provides domestic and symbolic stability, while adapting to shifting regional realities offers strategic and economic advantages. Balancing these competing pressures defines the core challenge.

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