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For more than six decades, the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), signed in 1960 between India and Pakistan with the World Bank as a facilitator, has been cited as one of the world’s most durable water-sharing agreements. Despite repeated wars, cross-border terrorism, and prolonged diplomatic hostility initiated by Pakistan, India continued to honour the treaty in both letter and spirit. However, changing security realities and Pakistan’s persistent sponsorship of cross-border terrorism have fundamentally altered the strategic context in which the treaty operates. Increasingly, questions are being raised over whether India should continue extending extraordinary concessions to a neighbour that has consistently undermined regional peace and stability.
The treaty itself was remarkably generous towards Pakistan. Although the Indus river system originates largely in territories under India’s control, the agreement allocated the three western rivers—Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab—to Pakistan, amounting to nearly 80 percent of the total waters of the Indus basin. India retained unrestricted rights only over the eastern rivers—Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej—while accepting significant restrictions on the utilisation of the western rivers. Many strategic experts have argued that India made substantial compromises in the interest of regional stability and humanitarian considerations.
Unfortunately, Pakistan has failed to reciprocate this spirit of cooperation. Rather than building lasting peace, successive Pakistani governments and sections of its security establishment continued supporting militant groups responsible for numerous terrorist attacks against India. From the 2001 Parliament attack and the 2008 Mumbai attacks to Uri in 2016 and Pulwama in 2019, India has repeatedly faced cross-border terrorism linked to Pakistan-based organisations. These actions have severely eroded trust and naturally prompted India to reassess the broader framework of bilateral engagement.
For decades, Pakistan has attempted to internationalise every technical disagreement concerning Indian hydroelectric projects, even when such projects remain within the provisions of the treaty. Projects such as Kishanganga and Ratle have been subjected to prolonged objections despite India maintaining that they are run-of-the-river hydroelectric schemes permitted under the treaty. Independent experts have often observed that Pakistan has increasingly used legal and procedural mechanisms to delay India’s legitimate infrastructure development instead of engaging constructively through technical dialogue.
Ironically, while Pakistan frequently accuses India of threatening its water security, many of Pakistan’s water problems are self-inflicted. The country loses enormous quantities of irrigation water because of ageing canals, poor maintenance, inefficient flood irrigation, and inadequate reservoir capacity. According to water management experts, Pakistan stores only a small fraction of its annual river flows, leaving it highly vulnerable during dry periods. Successive governments have failed to undertake comprehensive reforms despite repeated warnings from domestic and international institutions.
Population growth has compounded these challenges. Since the treaty was signed in 1960, Pakistan’s population has increased dramatically, placing unprecedented pressure on finite water resources. Instead of modernising irrigation systems, encouraging efficient agricultural practices, and expanding water storage infrastructure, policymakers often find it politically convenient to shift public attention towards India. Such narratives divert attention from the structural deficiencies that have contributed significantly to Pakistan’s growing water crisis.
Climate change has further exposed weaknesses in Pakistan’s water governance. Melting glaciers, irregular precipitation, floods, and prolonged droughts increasingly threaten water availability across South Asia. These environmental challenges require scientific planning, infrastructure investment, and regional cooperation. However, Pakistan’s inability to strengthen domestic water management continues to magnify the effects of climate variability.
India, meanwhile, has consistently maintained that it will utilise only those rights explicitly granted under the treaty. International law fully permits India to construct run-of-the-river hydroelectric projects and undertake limited storage within the treaty’s prescribed technical parameters. Accelerating such projects is both legally justified and strategically prudent, particularly considering India’s growing energy requirements and developmental needs in Jammu & Kashmir.
The development of hydropower infrastructure in Jammu & Kashmir carries significant economic and strategic importance. Improved electricity generation strengthens regional development, creates employment opportunities, supports industrial growth, and reduces dependence on fossil fuels. Efficient utilisation of India’s legitimate water resources also contributes to national energy security while benefiting local populations through enhanced infrastructure and public investment.
Another important dimension is national security. Water-sharing agreements are generally built upon mutual trust, peaceful relations, and respect for international commitments. When one party repeatedly supports activities that threaten the sovereignty and security of the other, it inevitably raises legitimate questions regarding the broader framework of bilateral cooperation. Many strategic analysts argue that while India has displayed considerable restraint for decades, it cannot be expected to separate water diplomacy entirely from persistent security concerns.
It is equally important to note that India has not advocated depriving Pakistan of water beyond the treaty’s provisions. Rather, India’s position has increasingly focused on fully utilising the rights already available under the agreement. This distinction is significant because exercising legitimate treaty rights cannot reasonably be interpreted as violating international obligations.
The future of the Indus Waters Treaty will ultimately depend on Pakistan’s willingness to build genuine trust, abandon the use of terrorism as an instrument of state policy, and engage constructively with India. Durable agreements survive not merely because they are legally binding but because both parties demonstrate sincerity in maintaining peaceful relations.
India has honoured the Indus Waters Treaty for over six decades despite repeated provocations. Pakistan, however, has too often responded with hostility instead of reciprocity. As India continues to emerge as a major global power, it is both reasonable and necessary for New Delhi to protect its national interests, maximise the utilisation of its lawful water rights, and ensure that strategic generosity is never mistaken for strategic weakness. A relationship founded on peace, mutual respect, and responsible conduct remains the only sustainable path forward, but that responsibility rests equally on Pakistan to demonstrate that it is prepared to abandon confrontation in favour of genuine cooperation.
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