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Its engineering units, medical teams, transport resources and trained personnel can complement the work of the district administration, police, SDRF, NDRF and other agencies.The floods of September 2014 provided one of the clearest examples of large-scale civil-military cooperation in Jammu and Kashmir.
In Jammu and Kashmir, a natural disaster rarely respects administrative boundaries, difficult terrain or security considerations. A cloudburst can cut off an entire village within minutes. A landslide can block a strategic road. A flood can isolate communities, damage bridges and disrupt electricity and communication. In such circumstances, the effectiveness of disaster response depends not only on the availability of resources but also on how quickly different institutions can work together. This is where civil-military cooperation assumes particular importance. The civil administration remains the primary authority responsible for disaster management, relief and rehabilitation, while the armed forces can provide specialised manpower, engineering capabilities, aviation assets, medical support, communications and rescue equipment when the scale or location of a disaster exceeds normal civilian capacity.Jammu and Kashmir already has an institutional disaster-management framework. The Union Territory’s disaster-management arrangements place important responsibilities on the administration at the state, divisional and district levels. The J&K disaster-management policy specifically recognises the role of the SDRF, NDRF, Fire and Emergency Services and J&K Police in assisting the civil administration during emergencies. District Disaster Management Authorities, headed by Deputy Commissioners, have an important coordinating role at the local level.
This institutional framework becomes particularly valuable in a mountainous area where accessibility can determine whether a rescue operation succeeds. The Army’s advantage is not that it replaces civilian agencies, but that it can bring capabilities that are difficult to mobilise quickly in remote or severely damaged areas. Its engineering units, medical teams, transport resources and trained personnel can complement the work of the district administration, police, SDRF, NDRF and other agencies.The floods of September 2014 provided one of the clearest examples of large-scale civil-military cooperation in Jammu and Kashmir. The armed forces and NDRF rescued more than 125,000 people during the operation. Army and Air Force aircraft and helicopters were deployed, while Army boats and NDRF inflatable boats were used in rescue efforts. Armed Forces medical teams operated in affected areas, relief camps were established and essential supplies were distributed. The Border Roads Organisation was also engaged in restoring road connectivity.The lesson from 2014 was not simply that the military could rescue people during a major flood. It demonstrated the importance of combining capabilities. The civil administration had local knowledge and responsibility for relief distribution and public administration. Police and disaster-response personnel provided essential ground support. The armed forces contributed specialised rescue, aviation, engineering and logistical capabilities. Together, these institutions could reach people who might otherwise have remained isolated.The need for such cooperation was again visible during the major weather-related emergencies of 2025. In August that year, cloudbursts, flash floods and landslides affected several parts of Jammu and Kashmir. At Chositi in Kishtwar, rescue operations were complicated by steep terrain, damaged connectivity and difficult weather. The government publicly acknowledged the integrated efforts of the military, paramilitary forces, J&K Police, administration and local people.
The response to the 2025 Jammu floods similarly demonstrated the value of inter-agency coordination. The Indian Air Force reported that its helicopters conducted more than 55 sorties in the affected Jammu and Punjab areas, rescuing 215 people and transporting essential relief material. The operations were conducted in coordination with the Indian Army, BSF, NDRF and local administration.These experiences suggest that civil-military cooperation should not begin after a disaster has already occurred. The most effective cooperation is built before the emergency. District administrations can identify vulnerable villages, bridges, roads, schools and health facilities in advance. Joint exercises can test evacuation plans. Communication protocols can be established so that requests for specialised assistance do not become unnecessarily complicated during a crisis.Preparedness is particularly important in Jammu and Kashmir because disasters can occur in very different forms. Floods and cloudbursts may require rapid evacuation and boats; landslides may require engineering equipment and road clearance; avalanches may demand specialised search-and-rescue capabilities; earthquakes can simultaneously create casualties, collapsed structures and communication failures.
The civil administration must therefore retain a clear coordinating role while ensuring that military assistance is integrated into a unified emergency-response structure. The objective should not be parallel operations by multiple agencies but a common operational picture in which every organisation understands its responsibility.There is also an important human dimension. During disasters, people do not primarily see institutions through organisational labels. They see rescuers arriving, roads being cleared, medical assistance being provided and essential supplies reaching isolated communities. In such moments, effective cooperation can strengthen public confidence because citizens witness institutions working together around a shared humanitarian objective.The experience of Jammu and Kashmir shows that disaster management is no longer simply a question of relief after an event. It is a continuous process involving risk assessment, preparedness, early warning, evacuation, rescue, relief, rehabilitation and mitigation. The establishment of a J&K Disaster Mitigation Fund in 2026 further reflects the growing emphasis on reducing disaster risk rather than relying exclusively on post-disaster assistance.
Civil-military cooperation should therefore be treated as a component of preparedness rather than an emergency improvisation. Regular coordination among district authorities, police, SDRF, NDRF, armed forces, health departments, road agencies and local communities can save precious time when every minute matters.Ultimately, disaster response is about saving lives. In Jammu and Kashmir’s difficult terrain, no single institution possesses every capability required for a major emergency. The strength of the response lies in bringing different capabilities together under effective civilian coordination. When the administration’s local knowledge, the police’s reach, disaster-response agencies’ expertise and the armed forces’ specialised resources work in harmony, the people affected by disaster receive something more valuable than relief alone: a coordinated, timely and dependable response when they need it most.
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