Opinion | How Pakistan’s Policies Have Worsened the Ailing Situation in PoJK

For decades, Pakistan has projected itself as the champion of the Kashmiri cause. Yet, the situation in Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir (PoJK) increasingly presents a difficult question for Islamabad: if the people are central to the Kashmir narrative, why have their basic economic, political and democratic concerns remained unresolved for so long?The recent unrest in PoJK is not simply the result of one particular price hike, one political party or one protest movement. It is the outcome of accumulated grievances. Rising costs, unemployment, limited economic opportunities, political interference and the perception that important decisions are taken outside the region have gradually created a deep sense of alienation among sections of the population.

The electricity crisis is perhaps the clearest example. PoJK produces substantial hydropower, including through the Mangla project, yet residents have repeatedly protested against electricity prices and demanded power at production cost. In 2024, a major protest movement forced the authorities to announce substantial reductions in electricity and flour prices after the federal government approved a Rs 23 billion relief package.The significance of that episode goes beyond subsidies. It demonstrated a fundamental contradiction in the governance model. A region possessing valuable natural resources still had to take its grievances to the streets before receiving relief in basic necessities. A sustainable system should not depend on repeated protests and emergency packages to resolve issues that could be addressed through rational economic and administrative policies.

The wheat and flour issue tells a similar story. The 2024 movement was initially driven by demands for subsidised flour, cheaper electricity and an end to what protesters described as excessive privileges enjoyed by the political and bureaucratic elite. The government eventually accepted major demands, but the fact that ordinary people had to undertake a prolonged agitation for basic affordability revealed the depth of the underlying problem.More troubling is the political dimension. Although PoJK has its own president, prime minister and legislative assembly, its political space has long been influenced by Islamabad. The controversy surrounding the seats reserved for Kashmiri refugees living outside the territory has become a particularly sensitive issue. Critics argue that these seats provide Islamabad with an avenue to influence local governments, while Pakistani authorities reject that interpretation.

This creates a damaging perception: that the people living in the territory have limited control over the political system that governs them. Once people begin to believe that elections cannot adequately change the direction of governance, economic grievances naturally acquire a political character.The developments of 2026 have made this contradiction even more visible. Regional elections were accompanied by serious clashes and allegations of political interference and electoral irregularities. Reuters reported that protests intensified after the Joint Awami Action Committee was banned and that long-standing grievances over political interference and economic neglect had become central to the unrest. More recent reporting has described the violence as among the most serious episodes of unrest in the territory in decades.

Instead of treating such developments merely as a law-and-order problem, Islamabad needs to examine the policies that produced the anger in the first place.One of the biggest weaknesses has been the tendency to respond to public dissatisfaction through temporary concessions rather than structural reform. Subsidies can reduce immediate pressure, but they cannot create employment, strengthen institutions or provide people with a genuine sense of political ownership. Every time a protest erupts, the government negotiates, announces a relief package and attempts to restore normalcy. But the underlying questions remain.

The economic challenge is particularly serious for young people. PoJK has limited industrial development and employment opportunities, while a significant part of its economy depends on government employment, remittances and small-scale economic activity. Recent reporting has placed youth unemployment at roughly 27 percent. A young population without sufficient opportunities is unlikely to remain satisfied with promises of subsidies indefinitely.There is also a wider question of resource distribution. The people of PoJK increasingly compare the resources generated from their territory with the economic benefits they receive. When a region produces hydropower but its residents complain about electricity prices, or when people living close to major natural resources continue to struggle with employment and infrastructure, the issue becomes one of fairness rather than merely economics.Pakistan’s response to dissent has further complicated matters. The use of force during protests, arrests of activists, restrictions on information and attempts to portray dissent primarily as a conspiracy or an externally sponsored activity can provide temporary political cover, but they rarely remove the original grievance. The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan itself conducted a fact-finding mission into the 2024 unrest and examined the use of force and the policies governing wheat and electricity.

The larger lesson is therefore quite simple. A political system cannot continuously demand loyalty from people while offering them limited space to question its policies. Nor can economic grievances be permanently managed through subsidies and administrative interventions.If Islamabad genuinely wants stability in PoJK, it needs to move beyond crisis management. The region requires stronger local institutions, greater economic autonomy, transparent resource-sharing arrangements, meaningful political participation, employment opportunities and an administration that is accountable primarily to the people living there.

The irony is that Pakistan’s Kashmir narrative places considerable emphasis on the political rights and aspirations of Kashmiris. Yet the continuing unrest in PoJK shows that political slogans alone cannot substitute for good governance. People ultimately judge governments not by the slogans they raise but by the electricity they receive, the jobs available to their children, the prices they pay for food and the freedom they have to question authority. PoJK’s present crisis, therefore, is not merely an episode of political unrest. It is a warning about the consequences of policies that have allowed economic hardship, political dissatisfaction and institutional distrust to accumulate over time. Unless Pakistan addresses these structural problems, every temporary settlement may only postpone the next confrontation.

Syedjahanzeeb2@gmail.com