Opinion | From Religion to the Dark Web: Pakistan’s New Route to Radicalise Kashmir’s Youth

Decades of violence have brought economic setbacks, empty homes, graveyards and the loss of generations of our own children. Pakistan may continue to change its methods, but it cannot change the lived experience of Kashmiris.

It is very evident how Pakistan and its deep state have been using every possible means to radicalise the youth of Kashmir. The most extensively used channel has always been religion. The concept, or rather the misconception, of so-called Jihad was systematically ingrained into the minds of Kashmiris, and religious extremism fuelled by Pakistan found its space in Kashmiri society. Even those who were separatists here would chant, “Pakistan se Rishta Kya? La Ilaha Illallah.” With greater awareness and the gradual unravelling of Pakistan’s real face, Kashmiris began to realise that Pakistan had never been their well-wisher. Much of what was being fed to them and given a religious colour was, in reality, a facade. In recent years, as Pakistan and its handlers realised that the old methods of radicalisation were losing their appeal among Kashmir’s youth, they increasingly turned towards another dangerous channel: narco-terrorism. Drugs were pushed into Kashmir, targeting young people and creating another route through which the ecosystem of radicalisation and terrorism could be sustained. The persistent efforts of the Jammu and Kashmir Police and the administration, including the anti-drug campaigns led by Lieutenant Governor Manoj Sinha, have brought considerable attention to the threat. But the methods of Pakistan’s deep state continue to evolve. While reading a recent report in the Hindustan Times, what particularly caught my attention was the revelation that Pakistan-based terror networks are now reportedly exploring pornographic websites and their chat features to establish contact with, recruit and potentially radicalise young people in Kashmir. It was astonishing, but not entirely surprising. When the objective is to destabilise Kashmir, Pakistan’s terror ecosystem has repeatedly demonstrated its willingness to exploit whatever avenue it finds available. In this article, I will examine how this emerging method works, why such platforms can become useful to terror networks, what precautions young people and families need to take, and why Kashmir must remain prepared for the newer and more sophisticated forms of radicalisation that may emerge in the future.

When I went through the Hindustan Times report, what caught my attention was that Pakistan-based terrorists and the ISI are reportedly moving beyond the conventional social-media platforms that have been used for communication and recruitment. According to security officials cited in the report, terror handlers are now exploiting chat facilities available on pornography websites and apps to communicate with potential recruits in Jammu and Kashmir. These platforms reportedly have real-time chat features, sometimes presented as facilities for finding people nearby, which are being exploited by handlers to communicate, pass information and coordinate activities. The report says this is part of a larger shift in the digital tactics of terror networks. Instead of relying primarily on commonly used platforms such as WhatsApp, Facebook Messenger and Signal, handlers are reportedly moving towards relatively obscure and privacy-focused applications that can make identification and tracking more difficult. For me, this is perhaps the most important aspect of the report. The platform is changing, but the objective remains the same: maintaining contact with potential recruits while staying away from communication channels that are already under greater scrutiny. Security agencies are also reportedly examining the use of Tor-based applications such as Coatex and Conion. Tor is a legitimate privacy technology and is used around the world for lawful purposes, but its architecture can provide anonymity by routing internet traffic through multiple relays. According to the report, terror handlers are exploiting such features to conceal their identities and make their communications more difficult to trace. The report also mentions privacy-focused applications that allow encrypted communication without necessarily requiring a conventional SIM card or phone number. Another application mentioned in the report is Moonchat, including versions using PGP encryption and versions reportedly originating from or associated with different jurisdictions. Some of these platforms can operate with limited conventional registration requirements. This creates another layer of difficulty for investigators trying to establish who is communicating with whom. Security agencies are therefore not merely looking at one website or one application, but at an expanding ecosystem of anonymous and encrypted communication tools.

The report further notes that some of these platforms can be accessed through VPNs, particularly where particular websites or applications are restricted in India. Again, VPNs themselves are not terrorist tools and have legitimate privacy and security uses. The concern is their reported combination with encrypted and anonymous platforms by terror networks attempting to conceal communication. The security challenge, therefore, is not pornography or encryption in isolation, but the exploitation of otherwise legitimate technologies and online services for covert terrorist communication and recruitment. What I found particularly concerning is the broader pattern. Terror networks appear to be moving towards platforms where they are less likely to attract immediate attention. Yesterday it was mainstream social media; then online gaming platforms; today, according to the security agencies cited in this report, even adult-content platforms and obscure encrypted applications are being explored. This shows how rapidly the digital methods of terror networks can evolve. The report is therefore not merely about terrorists using porn websites. It is about a new layer in the continuing cat-and-mouse game between terror handlers and security agencies. When one communication channel becomes easier to monitor, handlers look for another. The medium can change from social media to gaming, from gaming to encrypted applications, and now to seemingly unrelated online spaces. What remains constant is the attempt to establish contact, recruit, radicalise and coordinate while making detection more difficult. For me, the lesson from the report is clear: the fight against online radicalisation cannot remain confined to platforms that we traditionally associate with extremist propaganda. If terror handlers are prepared to exploit even an unexpected digital space for recruitment, our awareness and preparedness must evolve just as quickly.

How can this new method of radicalisation be tackled, and what responsibility does each stakeholder carry?

Having gone through the findings of the report, the next question that naturally comes to my mind is: how do we tackle such a challenge before it becomes another route for radicalisation in Kashmir? I believe the answer cannot rest with security agencies alone. The nature of the threat itself demands a coordinated response involving security agencies, cyber experts, NGOs, educational institutions, families and, most importantly, young people themselves. Our security agencies will have to continuously identify emerging digital trends and understand how terror handlers are shifting from one platform to another. Cyber-intelligence and information-sharing between agencies will become increasingly important because by the time a particular platform becomes widely known as a tool of recruitment, its users may already have moved elsewhere. I also believe that security analysts and cyber experts have a much larger role to play than merely responding after a threat emerges. They need to study the changing digital behaviour of terror networks and anticipate where the next communication channel could emerge. The same applies to civil society and NGOs. Awareness campaigns should no longer be restricted to conventional discussions on terrorism and radicalisation. Young people need to be made aware of digital grooming, manipulation, suspicious online approaches and the importance of reporting them. Educational institutions can also play an important role by making digital safety and responsible online behaviour part of their regular student-awareness programmes.

But no system can be effective if the family remains disconnected from the digital lives of young people. I do not mean that parents should turn into investigators or constantly monitor every activity of their children. What is needed is communication and trust. A young person who is approached by an unknown person online should feel comfortable enough to tell a parent, teacher or another trusted person without fearing immediate punishment or humiliation. Families should also be attentive to sudden and unexplained changes in behaviour, associations or online activity, particularly when these changes are accompanied by extremist content or suspicious contacts. None of these signs, individually, should be treated as proof of radicalisation, but they should not be ignored either. Ultimately, the first line of defence is the young person. Our youth need to understand that a stranger approaching them online may not always have the harmless intentions that are initially presented. They should avoid sharing personal information, photographs or compromising material with unknown contacts and should not allow an apparently casual conversation to move into increasingly secretive spaces. Suspicious approaches should be preserved and reported through appropriate channels rather than engaged with. In my view, awareness is the most important preventive tool here. If our youth recognise the method before the handler succeeds in establishing trust, a large part of the threat can be stopped at its very beginning.

How can a potentially radicalised or recruited individual be identified early, disengaged and brought back before the situation escalates?

The second question is perhaps even more important: if a young person has already come into contact with such a network, how can we identify the situation before it develops into recruitment or an actual security threat? In my view, the emphasis has to be on early identification rather than waiting for a person to reach the final stage of radicalisation. A sudden and unexplained association with unknown online contacts, increasing secrecy around digital activity, repeated exposure to extremist material, attempts to conceal communications or significant behavioural changes may sometimes indicate that something is wrong. But these should never be treated as automatic evidence of terrorism. Young people go through behavioural and social changes for many ordinary reasons, and context is essential. This is where families, teachers, counsellors, community organisations and security agencies have to complement one another. If a young person reveals that someone has approached them with extremist propaganda, promises of money, ideological messaging or requests to maintain secrecy, the immediate objective should be to separate that individual from the source of influence and report credible concerns through the appropriate channels. A young person who has merely been approached should not automatically be viewed as a terrorist. In fact, early reporting can give authorities and families an opportunity to prevent that individual from being further groomed or exploited.

I would therefore argue that our approach must move from simply asking, “Who has been recruited?” to also asking, “Who is being targeted, who is being approached, and how early can we intervene?” The difference is important. Once an individual has crossed a much more serious threshold, the response becomes predominantly a security matter. Before that happens, there is a much larger space for awareness, counselling, family support, community intervention and disengagement. The objective should ultimately be prevention, not merely detection after the damage has been done. If Pakistan-based handlers are continuously changing their digital methods, Kashmir too must continuously improve its ability to recognise and resist them. The platform may change, the technology may change and even the language of recruitment may change, but an aware young person who recognises manipulation is far more difficult to exploit.

Conclusion

Pakistan and its deep state may have received their answer about what Kashmiris want after the Pahalgam terror attack, when people across the Valley came out to condemn the massacre, denounce terrorism and, in many places, raise slogans against Pakistan. The response was significant because it showed how deeply the people of Kashmir have come to understand the price that Pakistan-sponsored terrorism has extracted from this land. No matter what new channel Pakistan chooses to recruit or radicalise Kashmiri youth, I do not believe it can easily undo this realisation. The reason is not merely that our security forces and intelligence agencies have become more capable of countering these evolving methods, but also that ordinary Kashmiris have experienced the consequences of terrorism themselves. Decades of violence have brought economic setbacks, empty homes, graveyards and the loss of generations of our own children. Pakistan may continue to change its methods, but it cannot change the lived experience of Kashmiris.

I am therefore hopeful that we will be able to deter this challenge as we have confronted others in the past. But that will require all stakeholders of peace to remain equally vigilant. Security agencies must stay ahead of emerging threats, civil society must build awareness, families must remain engaged with their children and our youth must understand that the newest digital platform can also become the newest tool of exploitation. If we work together, another attempt to push Kashmir towards violence can be prevented from taking root in our Valley.

The author is a Srinagar-based student activist and can be reached at soulofkashmir1@gmail.com