Opinion | OGWs: The Invisible Backbone of Terrorism in Kashmir and the Post-2019 Crackdown

One of the most significant indicators was the decline in local terrorist recruitment. Data referenced by strategic and security analyses showed that local recruitment, which stood at 143 in 2019 and rose to 166 in 2020, declined sharply afterward. The numbers reportedly dropped to 125 in 2021, around 100 in 2022, 25 in 2023, and only single digits in 2024. This decline did not happen automatically. The destruction of OGW networks made terrorism operationally difficult.

Terrorism in Kashmir was never sustained merely by the man carrying the gun. Behind every terrorist who managed to survive for months in orchards, forests, villages, or urban hideouts, there existed a parallel ecosystem operating silently in the background. This ecosystem carried messages, arranged shelter, supplied food, identified targets, transferred funds, monitored security movement, spread propaganda, facilitated recruitment, and in many cases shaped public sentiment. These individuals came to be known as Over Ground Workers, commonly called OGWs. For decades, the discourse around terrorism in Kashmir remained narrowly focused on encounters and casualty figures. The visible terrorist became the face of terrorism, while the invisible network behind him remained largely ignored in public understanding. Yet every counterinsurgency expert knew one thing clearly: terrorism survives not because of weapons alone, but because of logistics, local facilitation, ideological support, and information networks. An armed terrorist can survive without firing a bullet for weeks, but he cannot survive without support.

That support structure became one of the central targets of the post-2019 security architecture in Jammu and Kashmir. The term OGW itself evolved over time. In the early years of terrorism during the late 1980s and 1990s, such individuals were referred to locally by different names including “soyat” and “dragad.” Initially, their role revolved around basic logistical assistance. But with the changing nature of terrorism , the OGW network transformed into an organized ecosystem involving recruitment channels, financing routes, digital propaganda operations, and hybrid terrorism . Security agencies repeatedly described OGWs as the “lifeline” of terrorism in Kashmir. Investigations by the National Investigation Agency (NIA), Jammu and Kashmir Police, State Investigation Agency (SIA), and other agencies revealed how these networks allegedly worked in coordination with handlers sitting across the border. Funds moved through hawala channels, narcotics trade, charity fronts, religious networks, encrypted applications, and local conduits.

The structure was layered. Some OGWs were hardened ideological sympathizers. Some worked under coercion. Some were financially incentivized. Others became part of the network due to social influence, local pressure, or emotional radicalization triggered through funerals, social media propaganda, and communal narratives. A terrorist hiding in South Kashmir often depended upon an entire chain of local support. One person arranged shelter for a night. Another transported weapons. Someone monitored troop movement. Another created viral social media content glorifying terrorism after encounters. Some coordinated stone-pelting to help terrorists escape during operations. Others helped in recruitment by romanticizing armed violence among vulnerable youth. This ecosystem allowed terrorism to regenerate even after top commanders were killed.

Before 2019, Kashmir witnessed a disturbing cycle. Terrorists were killed in encounters, but recruitment continued. Funeral gatherings turned into mass mobilization platforms. Videos of local terrorists circulated widely on social media. Radical narratives increasingly occupied public spaces in parts of the Valley. Pakistani handlers and terror outfits understood that sustaining insurgency required social penetration, not merely infiltration. The cowardly done Pulwama attack of February 2019 became a watershed moment. The suicide bombing carried out by Jaish-e-Mohammed not only exposed the scale of radicalization and logistical coordination operating within Kashmir, but also demonstrated the lethal consequences of unchecked support networks. Following Pulwama and the abrogation of Article 370 in August 2019, the Indian government and security agencies fundamentally altered their counter-terrorism doctrine in Kashmir. The strategy shifted from reactive encounter-based operations to systemic dismantling of terror ecosystems.

The focus was no longer limited to eliminating terrorists in forests or villages. The new strategy targeted financiers, recruiters, propagandists, hybrid terrorists, facilitators, and OGW structures simultaneously. Multi-agency coordination expanded significantly through institutions such as the Terror Monitoring Group (TMG), State Investigation Agency (SIA), NIA, and financial intelligence mechanisms. Raids intensified across the Valley. Properties linked with terror financing were attached. Government employees accused of terror links were terminated under constitutional provisions. Hawala operators came under investigation. Digital surveillance increased. Jamaat-e-Islami networks faced scrutiny. Separatist funding channels were targeted. Thousands were detained under anti-terror provisions including the UAPA and PSA. According to reports citing official data, more than 1,900 alleged OGWs were arrested between 2019 and 2023, while over 2,700 individuals were booked under anti-terror laws. The impact of this strategy gradually became visible.

One of the most significant indicators was the decline in local terrorist recruitment. Data referenced by strategic and security analyses showed that local recruitment, which stood at 143 in 2019 and rose to 166 in 2020, declined sharply afterward. The numbers reportedly dropped to 125 in 2021, around 100 in 2022, 25 in 2023, and only single digits in 2024. This decline did not happen automatically. The destruction of OGW networks made terrorism operationally difficult. Terrorists increasingly struggled to find safe shelters. Communication channels became vulnerable. Recruitment pipelines weakened. The social space once occupied by glorification of terrorism began shrinking due to fear of legal consequences and sustained security pressure.

There was another important transformation after 2019: the emergence of “hybrid terrorism .” Security agencies argued that instead of joining organized terrorist groups permanently, some radicalized individuals carried out targeted killings while continuing normal civilian lives. These attacks particularly targeted minorities, migrant workers, political workers, and civilians. In response, the crackdown on OGWs became even more aggressive because authorities viewed the support structure as more dangerous than visible terrorism itself. The Resistance Front (TRF), believed by Indian agencies to be an offshoot of Lashkar-e-Taiba, became a major concern during this period. Investigations linked OGWs with assisting TRF operations, handling communication, arranging logistics, and aiding targeted attacks. NIA raids across multiple districts repeatedly focused on these support structures.

The modern insurgent no longer needs a large armed battalion to destabilize society. A small group with digital amplification, local facilitation, ideological messaging, and logistical support can sustain violence for years. This is precisely why counter-terrorism experts increasingly focus on dismantling networks rather than merely counting encounter statistics. The post-2019 security model in Kashmir reflected this understanding. It targeted the invisible architecture behind terrorism.

Today, the atmosphere in Kashmir is visibly different from the peak terrorism years. Public funerals of terrorists no longer witness the same scale of mobilization. Open glorification of terrorism has been completely eradicated. Local recruitment has sharply reached nil at the bottom. Tourism has witnessed unprecedented growth. Schools and markets operate with greater consistency than in previous decades. But this does not mean the threat has disappeared entirely. Pakistan-backed terror infrastructure continues attempts at infiltration and revival through sleeper cells, digital radicalization, and cross-border handlers. Recent operations in Jammu division and forest belts indicate that terrorist groups are adapting tactically. The lesson from Kashmir’s long conflict is clear. Terrorism is never sustained by guns alone. It survives through ecosystems of fear, financing, facilitation, propaganda, and silence. The OGW network represented that ecosystem for decades in Kashmir.

Post-2019, the security agencies and our government made the dismantling of this ecosystem a strategic priority. Whether one views the methods as necessary, excessive, or somewhere in between, the fact remains that the counter-terrorism doctrine fundamentally changed after Article 370’s abrogation. And perhaps for the first time in many years, the invisible infrastructure behind terrorism itself became the battlefield.

The writer is a student activist and can be reached at soulofkashmir1@gmail.com