Opinion | The Cost of Proxy War: How Pakistan’s Own Regions Are Becoming Victims of Its Terror Policy

If Pakistan fails to recalibrate its approach now, the consequences could be even more catastrophic. As the adage goes, when you play with fire, don’t be surprised when your own house burns down.

In the shadowy corridors of geopolitics, Pakistan’s experiment with proxy warfare has now begun to consume its own home. What was once a carefully crafted strategy to shape foreign policy objectives using non-state actors is now backfiring violently in provinces like Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and Balochistan. These regions, already burdened with historical neglect and economic stagnation, are now bleeding due to the very monsters the state once fed.

For decades, Pakistan’s security establishment viewed extremist groups as strategic assets. These groups were nurtured under the doctrine of “strategic depth” — primarily to influence Afghanistan and to keep India on the defensive. While this approach might have delivered short-term gains in the regional power game, the long-term costs are proving devastating, especially for ordinary Pakistanis in its western provinces.

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, with its proximity to Afghanistan, was central to Pakistan’s Afghan jihad policies. The tribal areas, once semi-autonomous and beyond the purview of constitutional safeguards, became sanctuaries for militants during and after the Soviet-Afghan war. When the US launched its War on Terror post-9/11, these same areas turned into battlegrounds, hosting Taliban factions and absorbing retaliatory drone strikes.

Today, KP finds itself in the crosshairs again. After the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan in 2021, there has been a resurgence of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which has regrouped and launched numerous attacks on Pakistani soil, especially targeting security forces and police in KP. Towns like Swat, once relatively peaceful, are now seeing a return of militancy, leading to widespread fear and disillusionment among locals.

Locals in KP are increasingly vocal about their frustrations. Protests in Swat, Dir, and Waziristan are demanding action, accountability, and above all, peace. The state’s inability — or unwillingness — to dismantle these militant networks has created an atmosphere of helplessness. For a region that has already sacrificed much, this return to chaos is a cruel betrayal.

Balochistan’s situation is equally grim, if not worse. Long marginalized and subjected to heavy-handed military operations, the province has harbored separatist movements for decades. Instead of addressing genuine political and economic grievances, the state has relied on coercion and counterinsurgency tactics that further alienate the local population.

In this volatile setting, the influx of Sunni extremist groups like Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and others has further complicated matters. These groups, at times tolerated or ignored due to their ideological alignment or usefulness elsewhere, have turned Balochistan into a sectarian killing field — especially targeting Hazara Shias and other minority communities.

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), touted as a game changer, runs largely through Balochistan, particularly the Gwadar port. Yet, for most locals, it has brought neither jobs nor security. Instead, there is increased militarization, surveillance, and a deepening sense of exclusion. Attacks on Chinese nationals, security personnel, and CPEC installations by Baloch separatist groups signal the growing volatility and resentment in the region.

The blowback from Pakistan’s proxy war strategy is no longer a hypothetical threat. It is tangible, bleeding, and visible on the streets of Quetta, Peshawar, and even Islamabad. Civilians, especially in KP and Balochistan, are paying the price for decisions made in drawing rooms far removed from the ground realities.

What’s particularly tragic is that the lessons of history have been ignored time and again. The Taliban’s takeover in Afghanistan was welcomed by some quarters in Pakistan, naively assuming it would bring strategic benefits. Instead, it emboldened groups like the TTP, who see the Afghan model as replicable in Pakistan’s tribal and settled regions.

Moreover, the policy of “good Taliban” versus “bad Taliban” has only bred confusion and mistrust. The state cannot differentiate between groups based on their utility at a given time. These groups often have overlapping networks, ideologies, and goals. Once empowered, their trajectory cannot be easily controlled. Ahead

The first step in reversing this damage is an honest reckoning. Pakistan needs to abandon the dangerous notion that it can manipulate extremism for strategic gain. A complete break from all militant groups, regardless of their past utility or ideological leanings, is imperative.

Equally important is addressing the root causes of instability in KP and Balochistan. These provinces require genuine political representation, economic development, and justice for victims of state and non-state violence. Marginalization and militarization are not sustainable governance models.

Engagement with civil society, building trust with tribal elders, empowering local governments, and ensuring media freedom in these areas can pave the way toward healing. But time is running out.

The cost of proxy warfare has come home, and its price is being paid by those least responsible — the ordinary citizens of KP and Balochistan. It is no longer just a matter of foreign policy; it is a domestic emergency. If Pakistan fails to recalibrate its approach now, the consequences could be even more catastrophic. As the adage goes, when you play with fire, don’t be surprised when your own house burns down.

About the Author: Syed Jahanzeeb is a freelance journalist focusing on South Asian geopolitics, conflict, and human rights. He has reported extensively from Pakistan’s border regions and believes in giving voice to the voiceless. He can reached on syedjahanzeeb2@gmail.com.