Every year, a measurable share of Pakistan’s foreign exchange earnings depends on a stretch of water Pakistan itself has no independent means of securing. Overseas remittances, a significant portion of them sent home by Pakistani nationals working as merchant crew, and trade flows tied to Karachi and Gwadar both run through the Gulf of Aden and the Bab al-Mandeb corridor at some point in their journey. The arithmetic is straightforward. The leverage to protect that arithmetic is not.
This is not a new vulnerability, but it has become considerably more visible over the past several years as the corridor’s threat profile has shifted. What began as a piracy problem, manageable through coalition patrols and escorted transit, has evolved since late 2023 into a theatre shaped by state-actor missile and drone attacks tied to the wider regional conflict involving Yemen’s Houthi forces. That shift changed the kind of naval capability required to operate there meaningfully. It did not change Pakistan’s naval posture, which remains built around the Arabian Sea and an India-focused threat environment that predates the current crisis by decades.
The consequence is a form of exposure that sits uncomfortably at the intersection of economics and security policy. Pakistan cannot easily reduce its reliance on this corridor — rerouting trade or discouraging seafaring employment abroad are not realistic short-term options for an economy already stretched on foreign exchange. Nor can Pakistan independently improve the corridor’s security, since the naval assets actually capable of intercepting missiles, escorting vulnerable shipping, or responding rapidly to an attack belong to a small number of other countries and the multinational structures they lead. Pakistan is left holding the economic exposure without holding any of the operational tools to manage it.
This produces a specific and underexamined kind of policy risk: outcomes in a corridor central to Pakistan’s economic stability are effectively set by decisions made elsewhere — in naval planning rooms and coalition headquarters outside Pakistan’s control — and Pakistan’s own influence over those decisions is limited to whatever standing its broader coalition memberships provide. When conditions in the corridor deteriorate, as they have repeatedly since 2023, Pakistan experiences the downstream effects — elevated insurance costs, disrupted shipping schedules, a harder environment for seafarers to work in — without having had a meaningful hand in the events that caused them.
Pakistan’s own naval response to regional maritime disruption, Operation Muhafiz-ul-Bahr, launched in March 2026 amid the broader Iran-US war, shows this limitation clearly rather than resolving it. The operation is scoped to Pakistan-flagged shipping on defined routes closer to home. It says nothing about, and does nothing for, Pakistan’s far larger economic stake in foreign-flagged shipping and overseas labor passing through the Bab al-Mandeb itself — the exposure that actually drives the country’s dependence on this corridor’s stability.
None of this suggests an easy fix. Building independent naval reach into a corridor this distant would require resources and strategic prioritization Pakistan’s current defense posture does not reflect, and reasonable people can disagree about whether it should. But the underlying mismatch is worth naming plainly: an economy this leveraged to a single maritime corridor, with this little independent capacity to influence what happens inside it, is carrying a form of risk that shows up in national accounts long before it shows up in any naval budget line — and that risk will keep compounding for as long as the mismatch between economic dependence and operational reach goes unaddressed.
Hailing from Kashmir and based in New Delhi, Mehak Farooq is a journalist specialising in defence and strategic affairs. Her work spans security, geopolitics, veterans’ welfare, foreign policy, and the evolving challenges of national and regional stability.





