Opinion | Why Pakistan’s PMs Never Complete Five Years

The deeper story is not about individuals, but about a political system that has never fully settled the question of who holds ultimate power

Since its creation in 1947, Pakistan has witnessed an extraordinary succession of political crises. Governments have been dismissed, military coups have overturned elected administrations, prime ministers have been removed through constitutional and judicial mechanisms, and political leaders have repeatedly found themselves either in prison, in exile or fighting for political survival. Yet beneath all these developments lies one striking and persistent fact: no Pakistani Prime Minister has ever completed a full five-year constitutional term.That record is not merely an unfortunate coincidence. It reflects a much deeper structural problem within Pakistan’s political system. The country has struggled for decades to establish a stable balance between elected governments, the military establishment, the judiciary, political parties and other powerful institutions. Governments change, political alliances change and leaders change, but the underlying contest over power remains.Pakistan’s first Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, came closest to completing a full parliamentary term in the early years of the republic, but his tenure ended with his assassination in 1951. What followed was a period of extraordinary political instability. Prime Ministers were replaced with remarkable frequency, while unelected institutions increasingly acquired influence over the political process. Khawaja Nazimuddin was dismissed in 1953 despite enjoying parliamentary support, establishing an early and dangerous precedent that political authority could be overridden by unelected power.

The problem became even more serious with the constitutional crisis of the 1950s. Pakistan adopted its first Constitution only in 1956, nearly nine years after independence. Within two years, however, President Iskander Mirza abrogated the Constitution and imposed martial law. General Ayub Khan subsequently removed Mirza and took control of the country.

That moment fundamentally altered Pakistan’s political trajectory. The military was no longer merely an institution responsible for defending the state; it had become a direct participant in the exercise of political power.The subsequent decades reinforced this pattern. General Ayub Khan, General Zia-ul-Haq and General Pervez Musharraf each ruled Pakistan directly for extended periods. Military governments came to justify intervention in the name of political instability, corruption, national security or the alleged failure of civilian leadership. Yet each intervention weakened the very democratic institutions that could have provided Pakistan with a more stable political order.Even when the military returned to the barracks, its influence did not simply disappear. The question was no longer only whether the military would directly govern. The larger question became whether civilian governments could exercise authority independently in areas considered strategically important by the military establishment.

The democratic experience of the 1980s and 1990s demonstrated the consequences. Benazir Bhutto’s first government was dismissed in 1990. Nawaz Sharif’s first government was removed in 1993. Benazir returned to power but was dismissed again in 1996. Nawaz Sharif returned with a much stronger parliamentary majority, only to be overthrown in General Pervez Musharraf’s military coup in 1999.Each government faced its own allegations and political controversies. Some administrations undoubtedly made serious mistakes, and accountability was necessary. But the larger problem was the manner in which political disputes were repeatedly resolved. Instead of allowing democratic institutions to develop through parliamentary competition, elections and institutional accountability, Pakistan repeatedly resorted to dismissal, disqualification, intervention or regime change.

This created a political culture in which the transfer of power became associated with confrontation rather than democratic continuity.The judiciary has also played a complicated role in this history. Pakistan’s courts have at various points validated extraordinary political arrangements, while at other times they have directly intervened in the careers of elected leaders. Yousaf Raza Gilani was disqualified as Prime Minister in 2012 following a contempt-of-court case. Nawaz Sharif was removed from office by the Supreme Court in 2017 following the Panama Papers case.Judicial independence is, of course, an essential pillar of democracy. Courts must be able to hold governments accountable. But when political battles increasingly migrate from Parliament to the courtroom, the political system itself becomes vulnerable. Instead of competing primarily through elections and parliamentary performance, political parties begin to focus on institutional alliances, legal battles and attempts to disqualify opponents.

The result is a system in which political power becomes extraordinarily fragile.

Yet it would be unfair to place the entire responsibility on the military or judiciary. Pakistan’s political parties have also contributed substantially to the country’s institutional weakness. Political parties have frequently been built around personalities and families rather than durable democratic institutions. Internal party democracy remains limited, while political leaders often seek institutional support when it benefits them and condemn those same institutions when they turn against them.This contradiction is one of the defining characteristics of Pakistani politics.A politician may condemn military interference while in opposition but seek establishment support while attempting to form a government. A political party may defend judicial independence when its opponents are facing legal action but question the judiciary when its own leaders are targeted. Parties that once demanded democratic principles can sometimes compromise those principles when political circumstances favour them.Consequently, the problem cannot be reduced to one institution or one political party.

The fundamental weakness lies in the absence of a durable political consensus about the rules of the game.The experience of Imran Khan’s government illustrated this problem once again. When Khan became Prime Minister in 2018, there were expectations that his government could bring a new political stability to Pakistan. Instead, his government eventually collapsed in April 2022 after he lost a parliamentary vote of no confidence.His removal demonstrated that even when a government comes to power through elections, completing a constitutional term remains extraordinarily difficult. It also revealed how quickly political relationships between elected leaders and powerful institutions can change.The irony is striking. Leaders who rise with the support of powerful institutions can eventually become their strongest critics. Political alliances that appear permanent can collapse within months. And governments that once seem politically secure can suddenly find themselves fighting for survival.This is why the question should not simply be, “Why did Imran Khan fail to complete five years?” or “Why did Nawaz Sharif lose power?” The more important question is why Pakistan repeatedly creates political circumstances in which elected governments become vulnerable to forces beyond ordinary electoral competition.

The five-year term itself is therefore not the real problem. It is a symptom of a larger institutional disorder.

A parliamentary democracy does not require every government to remain in power for five years regardless of circumstances. Governments can legitimately fall if they lose parliamentary confidence or if elections produce a different mandate. What matters is that political change takes place through predictable constitutional mechanisms rather than through coups, institutional manipulation, political engineering or extraordinary interventions.Pakistan has struggled to establish that predictability.Its political system has frequently operated on the assumption that governments are temporary occupants of power rather than institutions entitled to complete their constitutional mandate unless they lose the confidence of Parliament or the electorate. This uncertainty has consequences far beyond politics.Economic policy requires continuity. Foreign investment depends on political stability. Long-term development programmes cannot be effectively implemented when governments constantly fear premature removal. Foreign policy becomes vulnerable to internal political calculations. Public institutions become cautious because they are unsure which political authority will remain in power.

Most importantly, citizens lose confidence in democratic institutions when elections repeatedly fail to produce stable political outcomes.

The tragedy is that Pakistan has changed governments many times without fully changing the system that makes those governments unstable.The country does not necessarily need another “strong man” or another charismatic Prime Minister. What it needs is something much more difficult: strong institutions that are stronger than individuals.The military must operate within a clearly defined constitutional framework. Parliament must become the principal arena for political competition. Political parties must develop genuine internal democracy. The judiciary must remain independent while avoiding the transformation of political disputes into permanent constitutional battles. Elections must command public confidence, and political parties must accept that losing an election is not an existential threat.Most importantly, Pakistan’s political class and its powerful institutions must develop an understanding that democratic legitimacy cannot be treated as temporary permission.

A government elected by the people should be allowed to govern within the Constitution. If it loses parliamentary support, it should leave. If it fails in an election, it should go into opposition. If its leaders violate the law, they should face accountability. But the normal mechanism for political change should remain the ballot box and Parliament.The five-year term is not a reward for a Prime Minister. It is part of the constitutional architecture intended to provide continuity to elected government.Pakistan’s inability to complete that cycle is therefore not simply a record of unsuccessful prime ministers. It is a record of an unfinished democratic project.

Since 1947, Pakistan has changed leaders, governments, constitutions, alliances and political slogans. What it has not fully resolved is the fundamental question of where ultimate political authority should reside.Until that question is settled through a durable constitutional consensus, Pakistan may continue to witness the same cycle: a government comes to power with promises of stability, confronts powerful rivals and institutions, becomes politically weakened, and eventually gives way to another arrangement.The names may change. The parties may change. The political slogans may change.

But unless the rules of the political game change, the outcome is likely to remain remarkably familiar.

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